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Antidiscrimination Laws, Policy Knowledge and
Political Support
CONRAD ZILLER AND MARC HELBLING*
This study investigates how antidiscrimination policy and related policy knowledge inﬂuence citizens’
support for the democratic system and its institutions. The article argues that antidiscrimination
measures and knowledge about rights to equal treatment foster perceptions of government responsiveness,
which increase political support among target groups and citizens who advocate egalitarianism. Utilizing
a longitudinal design and more valid measures to resolve causality issues, the results of the empirical
models show that increases in policy knowledge over time systematically predict higher political support,
especially among individuals who hold egalitarian values. Individuals who are discriminated against
express particularly high political support in contexts where antidiscrimination laws are expanded. Overall,
the results amplify the role of policy knowledge as a key factor in studying policy feedback effects.
Keywords: antidiscrimination policy; policy knowledge; discrimination; policy effects; policy feedback;
political support
Citizens’ support for political authorities and institutions is considered indispensable to the
stability and viability of democratic systems.1 While a critical view of government performance
and outputs is seen as unproblematic or even desirable for the promotion of assertive citizenry,2
a well-functioning democracy also requires citizens’ support for democratic principles and
institutions. This fundamental, albeit diffuse, support is not only built on evaluations of
performance and policy outputs,3 but also derives from a match between citizens’ democratic
ideals and the actual quality of democratic procedures.4 Equal rights, impartial treatment by
ofﬁcials, and procedural fairness are core democratic principles that come under pressure
through discrimination and group-based inequalities.5
This study examines whether (and how) antidiscrimination laws foster political support in
Europe among both the targeted groups and the general population. The implementation of
antidiscrimination laws aims to reduce discrimination based on group characteristics such as
* University of Cologne, Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology and Cologne Center for Comparative
Politics (email: ziller@wiso.uni-koeln.de); University of Bamberg, Department of Political Science and WZB
Berlin Social Science Center (email: marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de). A previous version of this article was
presented at the 2016 American Political Science Association meeting. The authors would like to thank Sarah
Carol, Sara Wallace Goodman, Laura Katz Olson, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen and Markus Wagner, as well as
the anonymous reviewers and Shaun Bowler for valuable comments and suggestions. This study uses data from
the 2013 release of the anonymized EU Labour Force Survey, provided by the European Commission, Eurostat.
Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and/or conclusions of this study. Data replication sets are available
in Harvard Dataverse at: https://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MG11FA and online appendices are available at
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000163.
1 Easton 1965; Hetherington 1998; Marien and Hooghe 2011.
2 Norris 1999; Welzel and Dalton 2014.
3 Easton 1975; Seyd 2015.
4 Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016.
5 Thompson 2016.
gender, ethnic origin, disability and sexual orientation.6 These regulations concern the promotion
of equal rights, participation and incorporation, which we argue should inﬂuence citizens’
evaluation of political responsiveness and democratic practice.7
As objects of political support, we focus on the democratic system and its institutions.
To gauge this support, we look at evaluations of public administration in general, satisfaction
with the way democracy works and political trust in basic institutions. All three objects concern
general institutional aspects and have been shown to be inﬂuenced by both performance and
normative evaluations.8
In conceptual terms, our study draws on the policy feedback literature, which suggests that
policies act as institutions that affect subsequent policy development by generating
constituencies of supporters.9 Broadly speaking, this literature addresses the question of
‘whether policies render citizens more or less engaged in politics and how public programs
shape citizens’ beliefs, preferences, demands, and power’.10 More speciﬁcally, it posits that
policies shape citizens’ attitudes and behavior by allocating resources and creating incentives,
on the one hand, and providing information and normative content, on the other.11
According to its functional logic, antidiscrimination policy mainly addresses members of
groups at risk of discrimination. In terms of policy feedback, these groups represent potential
beneﬁciaries of the implemented policy measures, and should thus be particularly likely to
respond with political activation and support.12 While the policy feedback literature largely
focuses on speciﬁc target groups, less is known about policy effects among the general public.
Implemented antidiscrimination measures may prove to be relevant for a broader public because
they signal a government’s willingness to promote basic civil rights to equal treatment and
non-discrimination. In this case, citizens with complementary issue preferences should be
expected to respond with increasing political support because they feel their voices are being
heard in the political arena.13
Methodologically, the policy feedback literature has identiﬁed a number of limitations14 that
should be addressed in the following ways: (1) citizens’ reactions should be studied across a
wider range of public policies, (2) studies should focus on the attitudes and behavior of
recipients of public policies as well as those of the broader public and (3) greater
methodological sophistication should improve the resolution of causality issues. We respond
to these limitations by investigating a policy domain that has not been addressed in the literature
so far, which largely focuses on social and economic policies instead. We examine both target
groups and the general public by utilizing a time-series design and more valid measures than
those used in previous studies that will help us address endogeneity concerns. Speciﬁcally, we
not only look at concrete legislation, but also at knowledge measures that tell us what people
6 Amiraux and Guiraudon 2010; Givens and Evans Case 2014.
7 To date, all European Union member states have implemented antidiscrimination policies in order to
prevent unequal treatment based on various group characteristics. However, the range and effectiveness of
implemented national policies vary considerably (Bell 2008; Givens and Evans Case 2014).
8 Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016; Seyd 2015; Van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017; Ziller and Schübel 2015.
9 Mettler 2015, 270.
10 Mettler and Soss 2004, 60.
11 Mettler 2002; Pierson 1993.
12 Campbell 2003; Mettler 2002; Soss 1999.
13 Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Golder and Stramski 2010. We speak of government responsiveness even if
the executive body implements European Union regulations that have not necessarily been demanded directly by
citizens. In any event, these measures provide normative cues and respond to interests even if they have not been
explicitly articulated.
14 Campbell 2012, 348; Mettler 2015, 271.
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know about these policies. This allows us to address a general problem in this ﬁeld: It is often
argued that ordinary people hardly know anything about the policies in their country, a fact that
would hamper researchers’ ability to infer the effects of a speciﬁc policy on individual attitudes.
To test our argument, we use data from the Eurobarometer (EB) studies (2009–2012) and
the European Social Survey (ESS) (2006–2012) merged with time-varying information on
antidiscrimination laws and citizens’ knowledge of their rights. Our ﬁndings show that an
increase in policy knowledge over time systematically predicts higher satisfaction with public
administration, higher political trust and greater satisfaction with democracy. Moreover,
individuals who hold egalitarian values respond with disproportionately high political support
when policy knowledge is expanding, while people who are discriminated against are
particularly responsive to expansions in actual antidiscrimination laws and measures.
MECHANISMS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICY FEEDBACK
Antidiscrimination Policy and Material Interests
Applying the policy feedback framework to the area of antidiscrimination policy, one may posit
that people who actually or potentially experience discrimination based on group membership
constitute the main group of beneﬁciaries, and may thus be considered constituencies of
supporters. Individuals who experience discrimination are likely to be directly impacted by
policy content. Moreover, women and immigrants are, on average, at higher risk of being
discriminated against, which renders both groups potential target groups.15
Regarding the underlying mechanisms, antidiscrimination policy measures can be directly
linked to material concerns, especially in the domain of employment. Being discriminated
against in the job market or the workplace affects one’s career chances and thus one’s income
and work-related motivation.16 Similarly, restricting access to social services and housing
represents further instances of discrimination that involve material interests.17 We thus expect
antidiscrimination policies to play a particular role among people who are at least potentially
discriminated against, and who thus belong to the constituency that is most affected by these
regulations. Related arguments come from the general literature on electoral accountability and
economic voting. This literature investigates how voters react to changes in the economy and
the welfare state, and how material interests can explain voting behavior.18
Research on policy feedback has either ignored the responses of the larger public, or found no
systematic evidence that policies impact citizens’ support.19 The absence of policy effects might be
explained by the fact that people who are not targeted by a certain policy either do not feel that these
policies affect them, or are unaware that they exist. Material self-interest should be of limited
relevance for those who are unlikely to experience discrimination, such as heterosexual white men.
Nonetheless, anticipated risks of discrimination related to age, social status, health and disability could
also play a role for these groups. A similar argument comes from research on welfare support, which
indicates that younger cohorts also support old-age pension programs because they expect to rely on
them in the future.20 People learn about antidiscrimination measures through the mass media, civic
education, antidiscrimination disclaimers in job advertisements and workplace diversity training.
15 Schildkraut 2005; Schmitt and Branscombe 2002.
16 Altonji and Blank 1999; Kaas and Manger 2012; Rooth and Ekberg 2003.
17 Duguet et al. 2015; Walker and Walker 1998.
18 E.g., Giger and Nelson 2011; Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000.
19 Campbell 2012, 338.
20 Andersen 1992, 42.
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Antidiscrimination Policy and Interpretive Effects
In addition to material interests, the implementation of antidiscrimination policies may also
affect political support by shaping individuals’ views on the government’s level of interest in
promoting civil rights and protecting minorities. This relates to a second mechanism of policy
feedback that is centered on the role of information and normative cues, usually called
interpretive effects.21 In this vein, perceptions of government responsiveness to citizens’ needs
and demands represent such an interpretive mechanism inﬂuencing political support.22 In
accordance with the policy feedback framework, we expect speciﬁc groups of constituencies
to beneﬁt from the implemented policies in terms of interpretive effects. The implementation of
antidiscrimination measures should be particularly meaningful and informative for groups
exposed to discrimination. People who have been discriminated against are thus expected to
respond with increased political support. This might be due to a heightened perception of
political efﬁcacy23 and/or an altered sense of obligation to the polity in response to
improvements in status and/or incorporation.24
Apart from the potential impact on target groups, interpretive effects may be of particular
relevance for the general public, as a considerable proportion of people in European countries
support legal measures against discrimination25 and anti-prejudice norms.26 People might
disagree on the relative importance of the egalitarian principle of non-discrimination compared
to other political issues, or about the speciﬁc measures used to prevent discrimination.
Nonetheless, those who agree on the importance of non-discrimination are expected to support
antidiscrimination measures, even if they are not directly affected by such regulations. In terms
of mechanisms, the implementation of antidiscrimination measures serves as an informational
cue about how interested political authorities are in strengthening civil rights (and thus their
responsiveness to citizens’ needs), which in turn fosters citizens’ political support.
Speciﬁcally, we expect that citizens with egalitarian values will respond to an expansion of
antidiscrimination measures by offering more political support. This argument draws upon
research on representation and public opinion, which shows that citizens are more satisﬁed with
democratic practice when they live in a regime where political actors resemble their ideological
proﬁle.27 The mechanism underlying this relationship links citizens’ evaluation of the political
system to the perceived representation of their views and preferences by political actors.28
Research on ideological proximity between citizens and the incumbent government,29 between
citizens and political parties,30 and between citizens and political elites31 generally supports a
positive relationship between ideological congruence and political support. Nonetheless, the
relationship appears to be contingent upon institutional features of the political system.32
Applying this rationale, citizens who advocate the principle of equal treatment interpretively
21 Pierson 1993.
22 The perceived responsiveness of political actors is also referred to as external political efﬁcacy. External
efﬁcacy is, in turn, positively related to political trust and participation (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014, 15;
Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990).
23 Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014; Soss 1999.
24 Mettler 2002, 362.
25 European Commission 2008, 6.
26 Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsﬂaten 2013.
27 Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Golder and Stramski 2010.
28 Powell 2004.
29 Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Golder and Stramski 2010.
30 Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011.
31 Reher 2015.
32 Golder and Stramski 2010; Reher 2015.
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evaluate policy content in light of their needs and preferences, and should respond by offering
particularly strong political support when equal treatment policies are implemented.33
Investigating how citizens react to policy decisions, we should not forget that a considerable
body of research focuses on how public opinion inﬂuences the adoption of policies in a number
of areas.34 We, however, think that the issue of reverse causality should be of limited concern
here, as we focus on support for the democratic system and its institutions rather than support
for speciﬁc political actors or policy preferences. Decision makers may change regulations
depending on the support they receive or the attitudes voters have toward certain issues. As our
outcome variable of interest is less directed toward the realization of speciﬁc policies, reverse
causation is unlikely.
THE ROLE OF POLICY KNOWLEDGE AND MAIN ARGUMENTS
Studies looking at policy effects on public opinion assume that citizens know something (or at
least have a certain heuristic they can infer from) about implemented policies. However, this
assumption is problematic, as it is often unclear how much people know about the policies in
their country.35 Similarly, studies on economic voting assume that people are correctly
informed about unemployment rates, GDP growth or inﬂation. However, this research literature
has also contested whether or not citizens’ knowledge about these issues is accurate, and has
explored the extent to which perceptions are inﬂuenced by subjective considerations.36
The visibility and traceability of policies and related beneﬁts are crucial to understanding
policy effects. These characteristics affect the information people have about the issue and
therefore make it easier to connect policy measures to public responses.37 Following Kumlin’s38
proposal to incorporate subjective measures, we rely on indicators related to objective policy
content as well as subjective knowledge. This strategy is better suited to capturing general
processes of policy diffusion and related policy effects on citizens, as it does not focus on
indicators based on laws and their administrative implementation alone.
In one study incorporating subjective measures, Ziller ﬁnds that, on average, citizens are more
aware of their right to equal treatment in countries with comprehensive antidiscrimination laws
than those in countries with less comprehensive laws.39 This research also shows that changes
in knowledge levels are meaningfully related to individuals’ perceptions and experiences of
discrimination, which illustrates the importance of considering policy knowledge alongside
traditional indicators of implemented laws and measures. Some policy makers have also been
active in this regard. For example, the European Commission has launched a number of initiatives
to promote citizens’ awareness of their right to equal treatment.40 These knowledge-enhancing
initiatives address both victims and offenders, and are thus conceived as strategies to combat actual
discrimination and prevent unequal treatment.
Against this background, citizens’ knowledge of antidiscrimination policies reﬂects the
degree to which information about policy content has been diffused within society. As we
argued above, material self-interest is relevant particularly for the target groups (that is, people
33 Citrin, Levy, and Wright. 2014.
34 Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2012.
35 Campbell 2012, 338.
36 Kumlin 2014, 291.
37 Campbell 2012, 339–40; Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 2010; Gingrich 2014.
38 Kumlin 2014.
39 Ziller 2014.
40 European Commission 2014; see the EU campaign ‘For Diversity. Against Discrimination’.
Antidiscrimination Laws, Policy Knowledge and Political Support 1031
who are discriminated against), whereas interpretive effects are assumed to be relevant for both
the target groups and the members of the broader public with corresponding issue preferences.
This means that knowledge of policies, rather than the measures stipulated in laws, is
particularly indicative of policy effects among members of the general public (with
corresponding preferences). In contrast, individuals who experience discrimination are likely
to be exposed to speciﬁc antidiscrimination measures. We may assume that, on average, these
groups know more about their rights than other citizens and follow the implementation of policy
measures more closely. Hence, an effect of expanding knowledge levels should only be
marginally relevant to them compared to expanding antidiscrimination laws and measures.
We expect to see that the implementation of antidiscrimination policies leads to higher
political support among people who are discriminated against (compared to those who do not
experience discrimination) (Hypothesis 1). The implementation of antidiscrimination policies
leads to greater political support among people who advocate egalitarian values (compared to
those who are less concerned with egalitarianism) (Hypothesis 2). An increase in policy
knowledge represents a more valid indicator of policy effects, especially with regard to potential
interpretive effects among the general public (Hypothesis 3).
DATA AND METHODS
Data and Variables
To test our arguments empirically, we use survey data from (1) two waves of the EB (EB 71.2
2009 and EB 77.4 2012) and (2) four waves of the ESS (2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012). Both data
sources cover most European countries and contain indicators of political support. A question
from the EB data on how respondents assess the quality of public administration in their country
(four-point rating scale, ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’) serves as the dependent
variable. The outcome variables in the ESS data are political trust and satisfaction with
democracy. Political trust is measured with items on how much trust respondents have in the
country’s parliament and legal system. Scales range from 0 (‘no trust at all’) to 10 (‘complete
trust’), and we computed a mean index over both items (Cronbach’s α = 0.78). Satisfaction
with democracy is measured using a question on how satisﬁed respondents are with the way
democracy works in their country. This indicator ranges from 0 (‘extremely dissatisﬁed’) to 10
(‘extremely satisﬁed’). All three outcome variables are conceptualized as sub-dimensions of
political support and should therefore correlate substantially.41 At the same time, they reﬂect
different degrees of abstraction. This means that an assessment of public administration is more
strongly inﬂuenced by perceived outputs and performance than satisfaction with democracy
and political trust, while the latter two are more closely related to normative evaluations of
democratic practice.
The main independent variables are country scores on antidiscrimination laws and
antidiscrimination policy knowledge. For antidiscrimination laws, we rely on a sub-index of
the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).42 The country-speciﬁc scores are based on
expert ratings of national antidiscrimination laws and measures. They range from 0 to 100, with
41 Satisfaction with democracy and political trust correlate with r = 0.60 (p < 0.001). Moreover, responses to
the three indicators are similarly distributed (all three items have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1): Evaluation
of public administration: M = 0.44, SD = 0.26, Skewness −0.20, Kurtosis 2.3; Satisfaction with democracy:
M = 0.46, SD = 0.23, Skewness −0.14, Kurtosis 2.4; Political trust: M = 0.51, SD = 0.25, Skewness −0.26,
Kurtosis 2.4.
42 MIPEX; Huddleston et al. 2015.
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higher values indicating more comprehensive laws. Recently, the MIPEX scores have become
available as a yearly time series covering the period of 2007–2014, which we merge with the
EB and ESS survey data.
Policy knowledge is assumed to be inﬂuenced by policy measures.43 Policy knowledge as a
complement indicator therefore has to be measured at the macro level, because an assessment of
the effects of differences in policy knowledge as a result of (macro-level) differences in policy
measures necessarily refers to macro-level differences (for example, countries) and not
individual differences.44 Antidiscrimination policy knowledge is measured using an item on
whether respondents know their rights as victims of discrimination or harassment.45 Afﬁrmative
responses to this question were coded as 1, other responses as 0. The item is available for
four EB waves containing special modules on discrimination in the European Union.46
We aggregated this EB variable to sample-weighted country-year averages, serving as an
aggregated indicator of (changes in) citizens’ policy knowledge. This country-year indicator
was then combined with the respective survey data waves of both the EB and ESS.
Figure 1 displays the time series of the antidiscrimination law indicator and the policy
knowledge indicator for the countries and country-years included in the subsequent analyses.
For the knowledge indicator, about 33 per cent (ESS dataset) and about 42 per cent (EB dataset)
of the total variance is due to over-time variations.47 For the law indicator, about 7 per cent of
the variance (in both the ESS and EB data) is situated at the country-year level. Despite the
relatively small amount of over-time variance for the law indicator, we obtain systematic results
for a number of empirical models, as reported below.
For the EB data, we also include policy knowledge as an individual variable that accounts for
compositional effects.48 For the ESS data, we lack this information and hence include political
interest (0, ‘not interested at all’ to 3, ‘very interested’). People with high levels of political
interest tend to possess higher levels of general and speciﬁc political knowledge than those with
low interest.49 Some authors even combine political knowledge, perceived political competence
and political interest into one latent concept, termed ‘political capital’.50 It is, however,
important to note that using political interest as a proxy for individual political knowledge is an
imperfect approximation. Nevertheless, these variables are included here only to control for
compositional differences between country-years, and a supplementary analysis using EB
survey data shows that the empirical results are not sensitive to omitting individual-level
43 Ziller (2014) shows that antidiscrimination policy scores are positively related to levels of policy knowl-
edge in subsequent years, net of prior knowledge levels.
44 Preacher, Zyphur, and Zhang (2010, 210) note in this regard: ‘Any mediation of the effect of a Level-2 X
must also occur at a between-group level, regardless of the level at which M and Y are assessed, because the only
kind of effect that X can exert (whether direct or indirect) must be at the between-group level.’
45 The exact wording of the question is: ‘Do you know your rights if you are the victim of discrimination or
harassment?’ In comparison to common measures of political knowledge captured by test scores (e.g., Delli
Carpini and Keeter 1996), this measure refers to self-assessed or perceived knowledge rather than factual
knowledge. While individuals who report knowledge might disproportionately favor the implementation of
antidiscrimination measures, our scope of changes in knowledge levels over time mitigates concerns about
endogeneity. Moreover, the results from additional models using Eurobarometer data ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inter-
action between individuals’ policy knowledge and implemented antidiscrimination laws.
46 EB 65.4 2006, EB 69.1 2008, EB 71.2 2009, and EB 77.4 2012.
47 Estimated via empty models using the policy variable as the outcome in which country-years represent
Level-1 and countries Level-2 units. The obtained intraclass correlation coefﬁcient reﬂects the proportion of
variance due to country (compared to over-time) differences.
48 Enders and Toﬁghi 2007, 128–30.
49 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Galston 2001.
50 Zukin et al. 2006.
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policy knowledge. This gives us conﬁdence that the contextual effects – which we are interested
in – are largely independent of compositional differences.
For additional speciﬁcations exploring the role of discrimination, for the EB dataset we use items
on whether respondents have been discriminated against or harassed in the past twelve months
based on gender, age, ethnic origin, religion, disability, sexual orientation or other grounds. We
build a binary index of discrimination experience that is coded 1 when discrimination based on one
or more grounds was mentioned, and 0 otherwise. For the ESS data, we employ self-identiﬁcation
with a group experiencing discrimination on different grounds, including color or race, ethnicity,
nationality, religion, language, age, gender, sexuality, disability and other.51 Responses indicating
one or more grounds were coded as 1, and no discrimination as 0. Both forms of discrimination
refer to experiences of unequal treatment and are potentially overlapping. However, while the
experience of discrimination refers to speciﬁc acts of unequal treatment, identiﬁcation with
a discriminated group indicates whether or not discrimination has been absorbed as part of one’s
identity, most likely as a result of repeated experiences of discrimination and marginalization.
This assumption is underlined by the ﬁnding that an average of 15 per cent report that they have
experienced discrimination (EB data; between 8 per cent and 21 per cent, on average, per country),
while only an average of 6 per cent report identiﬁcation with a discriminated group (ESS data;
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Fig. 1. Policy indicators – time series by country
Note: BE, Belgium; BG, Bulgaria; CY, Cyprus; CZ, Czech Republic; DE, Germany; DK, Denmark;
EE, Estonia; ES, Spain; FI, Finland; FR, France; GB, Great Britain; GR, Greece; HU, Hungary; IE, Ireland;
LT, Lithuania; NL, Netherlands; PL, Poland; PT, Portugal; SE, Sweden; SI, Slovenia; SK, Slovakia.
51 The wording of the question is: ‘Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is
discriminated against in this country?’
52 Given the availability of data, we cannot examine the conditioning role of both forms of discrimination for each
indicator of political support. Coherent results across indicators would nonetheless provide support for our hypotheses.
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To gauge the moderating role of egalitarian values, we draw from Katz and Hass’s deﬁnition
of egalitarianism in terms of equality of opportunity, care for the well-being of others, and
protection of others’ interest and rights.53 In our study, we employ measures derived from the
Schwartz’ human values measures implemented in the ESS.54 Respondents were asked to rate
how similar to ﬁctitious persons they perceive themselves to be (ranging from 1 ‘not like me at
all’ to 6, ‘very much like me’ [recoded]). Speciﬁcally, we use the items ‘He/She thinks it is
important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He/She believes everyone
should have equal opportunities in life’, ‘It is very important to him/her to help the people
around him/her. He/She wants to care for their well-being’, and ‘It is important to him/her to
listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she
still wants to understand them’. The three items are collapsed into a mean index (Cronbach’s
α = 0.63), in which high values indicate high levels of egalitarianism.55
Additionally, we include the following individual-level control variables in the empirical
models: Age in years (EB and ESS), gender (1 = female, EB and ESS), immigration status
(1 = foreign-born, EB and ESS), education in years (EB and ESS), comfort with current income
situation (EB: 0, ‘Most of the time difﬁcult to pay bills’, to 2, ‘almost never / never difﬁcult’
ESS: 0, ‘very difﬁcult on present income’, to 3, ‘living comfortable at present income’),
employment status (1 = being unemployed, EB and ESS) and dummy variables on urbanization
of living area (EB and ESS). Age, gender, education and employment status are routinely
included in studies on political support.56 Most of this research suggests that political support is
higher among people who are older, male, better educated, not currently unemployed and
wealthier.57 Being foreign born is also positively associated with political support.58
As country-level control variables, we include time-varying country-level information on
unemployment rates derived from the Eurostat database, as well as proportions of foreign-born
immigrants derived from the European Union Labour Force Surveys.59 These controls aim to
tackle changes in societal conditions that may confound the indicative role of antidiscrimination
policy and related knowledge, such as externalities of the European economic crisis or a
changing demographic composition due to immigration. For ease of interpretation, all
continuous variables included in the empirical models were linearly transformed to range
between 0 and 1. An overview of the included variables is presented in Appendix Tables A1
and A2 (online appendix).
Analytical Strategy
To provide an assessment of policy effects, we use multilevel modeling that accounts for
non-independence due to clustered observational units and enables estimating relationships
between macro- and individual-level variables.60 In a ﬁrst series of multilevel regression
models, we estimate the average effects of antidiscrimination policy scores and policy
knowledge on citizens’ evaluation of the public administration, political trust and satisfaction
53 Katz and Hass 1988.
54 Unfortunately, we have no corresponding indicator in the EB data and therefore restrict this sub-analysis
to the ESS samples.
55 Note that using the single item on equal treatment leads to similar results as the ones reported below.
56 Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016; Van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017.
57 Satisfaction with income is used as a proxy for income because the income questions in the ESS changed
during the observational period and contain a large proportion of missing values.
58 Röder and Mühlau 2012.
59 Eurostat 2013.
60 Snijders and Bosker 2012.
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with democracy. To trace the net effects of each indicator, we include both simultaneously. All
models include individual-level control variables, dummy variables for country and time, and a
country-year random effect to account for the nesting of survey responses.61 Country ﬁxed
effects control for time-invariant variance between countries.62 We thus rely on within-country
variance over time, which mutes potential endogeneity bias caused by time-constant unobserved
confounders such as institutional differences or historical trajectories. We nonetheless include
the time-varying control variables on unemployment and immigration in order to prevent
potential bias from these time-varying inﬂuences. Time ﬁxed effects are included to avoid
spurious correlations caused by trending or periodical effects.
Since we are interested in effects in the general population as well as group-speciﬁc
effects, we separately estimate models for all available respondents, female respondents and
foreign-born immigrant respondents. As we have limited interest in the control variables, we
only present the coefﬁcient estimates of the law indicator and policy knowledge graphically.
Full model details are available in the online appendix.
Secondly, we interact the law indicator and policy knowledge with discrimination to test
whether policy effects are particularly relevant for people who have experienced discrimination.
This allows us to compare how within-country gaps in political support between the majority
population and people discriminated against are inﬂuenced by over-time variations in policy
and related knowledge. Like the main models, these models consider all respondents, as well as
women and immigrants only. To avoid over-ﬁtting or collinearity issues, we incorporate only
one interaction at a time. Models include the interaction term, its constitutive terms and
individual- and macro-level control variables. Moreover, we include a random slope for
discrimination, which means that we do not restrict the effect of discrimination to being equal
over time and across countries. Instead, we allow the relationship to vary across country-years,
which means, for instance, that there might be a particularly negative correlation
between discrimination and political support in countries that were disproportionately
impacted by the economic crisis. Likelihood-ratio tests indicate that the inclusion of this
random slope is justiﬁed from an empirical point of view. For the sake of parsimony, we only
show coefﬁcient estimates for the interaction term, and place full model speciﬁcations in the
online appendix.
Thirdly, we examine whether policy effects are contingent upon egalitarian values. To do so,
we interact the law indicator and policy knowledge with individual egalitarianism. Here also,
the models include control variables, the interaction, constitutive terms and a random slope for
egalitarianism. Full model details appear in the online appendix.
RESULTS
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate average effects of antidiscrimination laws and policy knowledge. The
results are presented in Figure 2. The estimates show that the antidiscrimination law indicator
is negatively related to evaluations of public administration, but positively related to Political
Trust and satisfaction with democracy. In most cases, these relationships are not systematic,
as indicated by large standard errors. Regarding policy knowledge, we ﬁnd systematic positive
61 This set-up resembles a multilevel model that accounts for all relevant components (country-year, year and
country), which is necessary to avoid potential bias from misspeciﬁcation in the random effects (Schmidt-Catran
and Fairbrother 2016).
62 The resulting macro-level estimates are equivalent to panel ﬁxed effects estimates (Allison 2009).
A comparable analytical strategy would be to additionally include a country-level intercept and disaggregate the
macro-level variables into cross-sectional and longitudinal components (Fairbrother 2014).
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relationships with all three indicators of political support. The associations are systematic for
most speciﬁcations, except for immigrants’ political trust and evaluation of public
administration. Overall, this lends empirical support to the hypothesis that increasing
awareness of civil rights fosters perceived political responsiveness, which leads to greater
political support.63
Regarding the effect sizes, the interpretation is facilitated by rescaling the included variables.
Thus, the coefﬁcient estimates reﬂect the change in the outcome when moving from the
minimum to the maximum observed values of the predictor variables. Hence, moving from the
lowest to the highest policy knowledge context is associated with an increase in positive
evaluation of public administration by two-thirds of a standard deviation (Model M1), an
increase in political trust by two-thirds of a standard deviation (Model M4) and an increase in
satisfaction with democracy by two-ﬁfths of a standard deviation (Model M7). Compared to
other factors, the average effects of policy knowledge across models are slightly higher than











DV: Eval. public administration
DV: Political trust
DV: Satisfaction democracy
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Law indicator Knowledge indicator
Fig. 2. Law and knowledge effects on political support
Note: DV, dependent variable. Solid bars represent 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Models include control
variables as well as country and time ﬁxed effects. Full model details appear in the online appendix. Number
of Level-1 (Level-2) observations are for M1: 38406 (42), M2: 20825 (42), M3: 2170 (42), M4: 121397 (77),
M5: 64618 (77), M6: 8953 (77), M7: 121397 (77), M8: 64618 (77), M9: 8953 (77).
63 Regarding the individual-level control variables, models using Eurobarometer data (M1–M3) show that
individual policy knowledge is positively related to the evaluation of public administration. For models using
ESS data (M4–M9), we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between political interest and political support. Being
from an immigrant background and being satisﬁed with one’s income have an overall positive effect, while being
unemployed and unemployment rates are negatively related. The relationships with age, gender, education, living
area and proportions of immigrants are less systematic across model speciﬁcations. The detailed results appear in
Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
64 At the individual level, the effect of individual policy knowledge is moderate in strength, but still
comparable to other individual-level predictors such as being unemployed. Political interest yields an effect size
comparable to education and satisfaction with income.
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In the next step, we turn to the role of discrimination as a conditioning factor. Before
estimating interactions, we examine the average effects of discrimination (not shown). Having
experienced discrimination is related to a less favorable assessment of public administration
(B = − 0.05, SE = 0.00, CIs [−0.05, −0.04]). Being a member of a group that is discriminated
against is associated with lower levels of political trust (B = −0.07, SE = 0.00, CIs [−0.07,
−0.06]), and satisfaction with the way democracy works in the respondent’s country
(B = −0.09, SE = 0.00, CIs [ −0.09, −0.08]). The reported effects refer to the full sample,
but they occur in comparable strength and precision when we consider women or immigrants
separately.
The results of the estimated interactions between antidiscrimination laws and discrimination,
as well as policy knowledge and discrimination, are presented in Figure 3. The results show
substantial positive interactions for the law indicator over all three outcomes, while the results
are least systematic for evaluations of public administration (statistically signiﬁcant relationship
only for women). Nonetheless, they indicate that an expansion of antidiscrimination measures is
related to disproportionately high levels of political support for people who experience
discrimination. Interpreted symmetrically, the negative relationship between discrimination and
political support is mitigated in contexts where antidiscrimination laws are expanding.
Corresponding marginal effects plots are presented in Appendix Figures A1 and A2 (online
appendix). Moreover, the results provide no systematic empirical support for the hypothesis that
changes in policy knowledge and discrimination meaningfully interact. This supports our
expectation that target groups of antidiscrimination measures are especially responsive to
changes in laws and implemented measures, while changes in general knowledge levels have a
limited impact on these groups.
As another hypothesis test, we interact the law and knowledge indicators with egalitarian
values. The corresponding estimates of the interaction terms appear in Figure 4. Models testing










DV: Eval. public administration
DV: Political trust
DV: Satisfaction democracy
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2
Law indicator Knowledge indicator
Fig. 3. Discrimination as conditioning variable – interaction effects
Note: DV, dependent variable. Estimates of interaction terms are shown. Solid bars represent 95 per cent
conﬁdence intervals. Models include constitutive terms, control variables as well as country and time ﬁxed
effects. Full model details appear in the online appendix. Number of Level-1 (Level-2) observations are for
M10/M11: 38270 (42), M12/M13: 20749 (42), M14/M15: 2160 (42), M16/M17/M22/M23: 121397 (77),
M18/M19/M24/M25: 64618 (77), M20/M21/M26/M27: 8953 (77).
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political trust (B = −0.01, SE = 0.00, CIs [−0.02,0.00]) and satisfaction with democracy
(B = −0.00, SE = 0.00, CIs [−0.01,0.00]). For interactions with the law indicator, the
coefﬁcient estimates show no systematic relationships. In contrast, we ﬁnd positive signiﬁcant
interactions between egalitarian values and policy knowledge for most model speciﬁcations,
except for models on immigrants only. In substantive terms, this means that increasing policy
knowledge is more strongly associated with higher political support for people who hold
egalitarian values. Alternatively, egalitarianism is linked more strongly to political support in
the context of expanding policy knowledge. Corresponding marginal effects plots are presented
in Appendix Figures A3 and A4, and show that people low in egalitarianism are largely
unaffected, while the found interaction is driven by people high in egalitarianism gaining
political support when policy knowledge increases.
Robustness
To ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings, we test a number of additional speciﬁcations. First, we
consider group-speciﬁc aggregation of policy knowledge for women and foreign-born
immigrants only. The policy knowledge of the general public is almost perfectly correlated
with women’s policy knowledge (r = 0.97) across the included 21 countries, while the
correlation with immigrants’ knowledge is lower, but still substantial (r = 0.62). Using policy
knowledge of women as an alternative indicator in the multivariate models, we ﬁnd virtually
congruent estimates for the general indicator. When we incorporate immigrants’ policy
knowledge when focusing on immigrants, the results are comparable to those shown in the
Results section, with slightly smaller coefﬁcient estimates and higher standard errors.
Secondly, we estimate models without a random effect for country-years. The resulting
coefﬁcient estimates largely resemble those reported, while the standard errors are considerably









-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Law indicator Knowledge indicator
Fig. 4. Egalitarian values as conditioning variable – interaction effects
Note: DV, dependent variable. Estimates of interaction terms are shown. Solid bars represent 95 per cent
conﬁdence intervals. Models include constitutive terms, control variables as well as country- and time-ﬁxed
effects. Full model details appear in the online appendix. Number of Level-1 (Level-2) observations are for
M28/M29/M34/M35: 121397 (77), M30/M31/M36/M37: 64618 (77), M32/M33/M38/M39: 8953 (77).
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than changes over time, and yield similar results to those obtained when omitting the country-
year intercept. Overall, these alternate speciﬁcations indicate that the policy effects reported in
the Results section are conservative in terms of statistical testing.
CONCLUSION
This study examined antidiscrimination policy effects on political support. In doing so, we
connect a rather narrow policy area to general questions about democratic governance. Thus our
study complements research on the foundations of political support that focuses on broad
indicators of economic performance and institutional quality.65 At the same time, it is essential
to empirically investigate the speciﬁc claims that are made about the effects of
antidiscrimination policies. Our study not only tests the effectiveness of these policies, but –
in a broader sense – is also relevant for debates about the impact of European Union directives
on political and societal change within member states.66
In the central argument of our study, we contended that antidiscrimination measures initiate
resource effects and enhance perceptions of government responsiveness, which in turn foster
political support. While we expected particularly strong effects for groups targeted by policy
content (that is, people who experience discrimination), we also made a case for policy effects
among the general public. The argument was that antidiscrimination policies are particularly
relevant – in terms of political support – for citizens who advocate equal treatment. Moreover,
we expected that (changes in) policy knowledge is a crucial element linking policy effects with
individual political support, especially for individuals who are usually not directly exposed to
antidiscrimination measures. The results show that, on average, public knowledge about their
right to equal treatment predicts higher satisfaction with public administration, higher political
trust and higher satisfaction with democracy. By contrast, expert ratings of implemented laws
yield few systematic average relationships. This suggests that policy knowledge is particularly
suited to capturing policy effects in the general population that would have been overlooked
when relying solely on indicators measuring law.
With regard to the speciﬁc social mechanisms, we ﬁnd that those who advocate egalitarian
values express more political support for antidiscrimination policies under expanding policy
knowledge levels. This lends additional empirical support to interpretive mechanisms, operating
in particular for the general public. A societal diffusion of knowledge about civil rights
increases perceptions of government responsiveness, which increases political support. With
regard to group-speciﬁc effects, we ﬁnd only minor differences in policy knowledge effects
when focusing on women or immigrants only. Similarly, we ﬁnd no systematic evidence that
people who report discrimination are disproportionately affected by increasing knowledge
levels. This suggests that policy knowledge is less indicative for people who are discriminated
against, most likely because these groups already have substantive knowledge of their rights.
Instead, we ﬁnd that these groups respond by increasing their political support when
antidiscrimination laws are expanded. This indicates that individuals who are targeted by (and
exposed to) policy content respond measurably to policy changes over time.
From an analytical viewpoint, our results are one of only a few comparative longitudinal
studies on policy effects investigating both the general public and target groups. Our research
design avoids the bias typical of cross-sectional studies on policy effects, which arises due to
unobserved historical or institutional factors that may determine both policy implementation
65 Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016; Norris 1999; Van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017.
66 Ellis and Watson 2012.
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and patterns of political support. Moreover, in relying on survey data from large random
samples, we circumvent a problem that has been identiﬁed in laboratory studies on information
or framing effects on political opinion. In real-world settings, people are much more selective in
collecting information, which calls the external validity of the effects of information primes in
controlled lab settings into question.67 However, using available survey data comes with the
limitation of an imperfect connection between given variables and the theoretical concepts
under study. For instance, it would be useful to examine the speciﬁc role of material and
interpretive mechanisms more explicitly in future research. Another important avenue for future
studies is to extend the research design to policy areas other than antidiscrimination. This would
allow for the generation of additional evidence on policy knowledge effects and underlying
mechanisms. Our study also informs strategies for political communication and civic education
that emphasize knowledge enhancement related to civil rights.
Finally, it would also be interesting to study the effects of antidiscrimination policy and
policy knowledge on political participation. In additional analyses using ESS data, we
investigated relationships with electoral and non-electoral participation. For electoral
participation, the law indicator showed modest (negative) but non-signiﬁcant associations. In
contrast, the coefﬁcient estimates of policy knowledge were positive for all groups, and they
were statistically signiﬁcant for the general public and women. This means that an increase in
knowledge levels is systematically associated with higher rates of electoral participation. For
non-electoral participation, however, we found no systematic relationships.
These preliminary ﬁndings suggest an interesting avenue for further research. However, that
would require more detailed measures of political participation and theories that allow us to
causally link antidiscrimination policies and political behavior. One could argue that electoral
participation signiﬁes that someone supports the democratic system, while non-electoral
participation signals opposition. If this were true, these ﬁndings would be in line with the main
results of this article, namely that antidiscrimination measures and related policy knowledge
lead to higher support for the democratic system. However, one could also argue that electoral
participation decreases when people are satisﬁed with current policies, or that non-electoral
participation is an essential part of a democratic decision-making process that requires a certain
degree of conﬁdence in that process. Hence, in addition to more detailed information on why
people are politically engaged, we need to elaborate on which mechanisms not only lead to
more political support, but also to certain political behavior.
Most importantly, this study shows that an expansion in antidiscrimination measures and
increasing awareness of and knowledge about rights to equal treatment are vital for generating
political support for speciﬁc groups as well as a broader public with corresponding issue
preferences. Against the background of increasing ethnic and social diversity in modern
societies, this research suggests avenues for strengthening citizens’ support for democratic
institutions and political engagement.
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